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ABSTRACT 
 
The migration situation in Kazakhstan is one of the most complex ones in the World. The current 
oil price plunge, which started in mid-2014, has seriously affected the oil-dependent Kazakh economy 
as well as the social sphere in general and the migration situation in particular. This article starts 
with a general overview of the migration situation in the country, studies the correlation between 
changes in real GDP and balance of migration and then addresses the migration processes in the 
Western oil-producing regions of the country. The paper specifically addresses these regions because 
they are more attractive, as half of all foreign labour force officially working in the country is employed 
here as well as most of the illegal and in-country migrants. Also we should not omit one very 
important factor – in the oil producing regions of the country the relations between the local population 
and labour migrants are traditionally strained. Over the last 30 years there were many cases of social 
unrests and clashes between Kazakh and foreign workers. These facts show how important this 
problem is and that neglecting it by businesses, government entities and the local population can 
provoke further social problems. The article analyses potential consequences of the current oil plunge 
on migration dynamics and recommends actions to be taken by government entities to mitigate the 
resulting negative consequences. 
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INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Changes in dimensions, characteristics, causes and consequences of migration have 
become one of the most important consequences of the current oil plunge, which 
started in June 2014.  
Kazakhstan is usually not in the limelight of discussions on migration issues. 
However, this does not imply low level of migration intensity in Kazakhstan. This is 
not true at all. According to Ratha, Plaza, and Ozden (2016), the World Bank advises 
that “Despite the media focus on migration to high-income OECD countries, South-
South migration is larger than South-North migration. Outside the high-income 
OECD countries, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, India, Thailand, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, and South Africa are among the top host countries, mostly for migrants 
from neighbouring countries”. 
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Recognizing the importance of both voluntary migration and forced displacement 
in the region, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees launched the 
Almaty1 Process, which “is a regional consultative process on refugee protection and 
international migration and aims to address the multiple challenges resulting from 
mixed migration dynamics and enhance regional cooperation and coordination on 
mixed migration.” (UNHCR , 2017). 
 
Figure 1  
 
Political and Administrative Map of Kazakhstan 
 
 
Source: Global City Map, 2017 
 
Based on UN Population Division (2017) estimates, Migration Policy Institute (2017) 
(MPI) ranks the country 16th as a destination country and 13th as a sending country. 
According to MPI data, in 2015 the immigrant population of Kazakhstan was 20.12% 
of total resident population and in the same year 18.78% of all citizens of Kazakhstan 
lived outside their country of origin. Thus, Kazakhstan along with Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates is among the countries 
with the biggest share of migrant population in the world UN Population Division 
(2017). 
The International Organization for Migration “defines a migrant as any person who is 
moving or has moved across an international border or within a State away from 
his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the person’s legal status; (2) 
                                                     
1 Almaty is the biggest city and former capital of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
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whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes for the 
movement are; or (4) what the length of the stay is.” 2  This document mostly 
concentrates on external migration referring to internal migration when necessary. 
The situation with migration in the country is unique and characterized by the 
following: 
- Massive emigration of the population of European origin (mostly Slavic, German 
and Greek) after the collapse of the USSR (see Figures 2 and 3 below); 
- Transfer of the country capital from Almaty to Astana in 1997 and massive 
migration of the population to the new capital associated with this; 
- Repatriation of ethnic Kazakhs (oralmans); 
- The country is in the UN List of twenty countries or areas of origin with the 
largest diaspora populations (4 million) (International Migration Report, 2015, 2016); 
- Influx of foreign labor force. Mostly from Central Asia countries, China and 
Turkey; 
- Simultaneous urbanization and de-urbanization processes; 
- Development of transit and illegal migration. 
The dynamics of migration in Kazakhstan since 1991 is shown on the Figure 2 and 
Figure 3. As you can see the migration situation in Kazakhstan is characterized by two 
oppositely directed trends of immigration and emigration. Since 2003 these trends 
almost compensated for each other giving very small numbers of the balance of 
migration and net migration rate. 
 
Figure 2.  
 
Number of immigrants and emigrants in Kazakhstan 
 
 
Source: Based on StatCom, 2016. 
                                                     
2 https://www.iom.int/who-is-a-migrant  
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Figure 3  
 
Net migration rate in Kazakhstan, 1991 – 2015 
 
Source: Based on StatCom, 2016. 
 
It is interesting to study the correlation between some macroeconomic indicators 
and the balance of migration. As stated by N. Volchkova, Policy Director of the 
Centre for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR), Moscow in December 2015 “any 
changes in the oil price level affect the economy not only in a nominal way, but also 
in a structural manner. A change impacts the cost of production in all industries and 
sectors, as well as the disposable income in the country, but it also affects the 
exchange rates and the overall uncertainty. This, in turn, affects exports, imports, 
current accounts, the comparative advantage of countries, as well as the global value 
chains. In an economy where labour, capital and energy are inputs to production, and 
capital/labour and energy are complements, a sudden oil price increase is likely to be 
compensated by labour adjustments. Thus, there might be a structural effect on 
employment, affecting the entire economy” (Le Coq and Trkulja, 2015).  
So, the question of this research is what potential government policy measures 
could be to mitigate the negative social consequences of the current economic crisis. 
 
METHODS USED  
 
The research was conducted on the basis of a literature review, analysis of economic 
data and meetings with professionals working in the oil industry of Kazakhstan. 
Empirical approaches were employed in this document to analyse migration 
processes and recommend measures to be taken by the government of Kazakhstan 
in order to mitigate the negative consequences of the oil price plunge on migration 
processes in the country. 
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CORRELATION BETWEEN KAZAKH GDP CHANGE AND 
MIGRATION PROCESSES 
 
Expectedly, many researchers as well as the Kazakh government agencies for 
example Sadovskaya (2014) and MinEconomy (2015) noted the dependence between 
economic growth and migration processes in the country. It is suggested to look at 
the situation in more details.   
If we look at the Figure 4, we can notice a lag between changes in the real economic 
situation and balance of migration. This lag reflects expectations of upcoming 
economic downturns. If we shift the balance of migration one year back, the 
correlation becomes even more evident. 
 
Figure 4  
 
Correlation between Change in Real GDP and Balance of Migration 
 
 
Source: Based on StatCom, 2016.  
 
In this case the correlation coefficient is equal to 79% as opposed to 73% in the 
previous case. These calculations are based on StatCom (2016) data. 
The Figure 4 and Figure 5, once again reconfirm that in recent years, economic 
reasons were the main cause of migration processes in the country. Moreover, the 
previous Figure 5 shows that in situations when economic problems are expected, oil 
companies’ managers try to cut costs in advance. Migrant workforce and service 
contracts are usually the first to suffer in such situations. 
The number of real refugees, i.e. those who have been forced to flee his or her country 
because of persecution, war, or violence, in the country is very small. Per the information 
of UNHCR (2017) “As of 1 July 2016, 653 men, women and children have been 
recognized as refugees on an individual basis by the State under the 1951 Convention 
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and the national Refugee Law. Kazakhstan also continues receiving asylum-seekers 
primarily from Afghanistan and Syria, and very few from other countries. The majority 
of refugees have been residing in Kazakhstan for over ten years.”  
 
Figure 5 
 
Correlation between Change in Real GDP and Lagged Balance of Migration 
(-1 year) 
 
 
Source: Based on StatCom, 2016. 
 
MIGRATION PROCESSES IN THE WESTERN OIL-PRODUCING 
REGIONS OF KAZAKHSTAN 
 
The western regions of Kazakhstan include Aqtobe, Atyrau, Mangghystau and West 
Kazakhstan regions of the country. The country map is given in Figure 1 above. 
These migration processes in western oil-producing regions occur in the 
following forms:  
Intra-regional rural-to-urban migration: 
- In-country migration. It includes (i) resettlement of people from other 
regions of Kazakhstan to the western oil-producing regions, (ii) a flow of 
shift employees mostly working for oil and oil service companies and (iii) 
resettlement of western region residents to the country capital Astana and 
the country’s biggest city, Almaty; 
- Immigration. It mostly includes labor immigration, both official attraction 
of foreign labor and uncontrolled illegal labor migration, mainly from the 
neighboring countries; 
- Emigration. Very active in the 90’s, this process is again on the rise since the 
beginning of the oil price plunge. 
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Being by far the biggest driver of the Kazakh economy, the oil industry affects 
migration processes in Kazakhstan seriously. This is especially true for Western 
Kazakhstan where the labor market is dominated by the oil industry.  
Another important point is that the oil sector offers job opportunities not only in 
production and exploration of oil, but also in connected services such as 
construction, machine-building, transportation, security, etc. In Kazakhstan low oil 
prices lead to oil production decrease and this in turn leads to curtailing costs, 
investments and connected companies’ downsizing.  
As in the most of the other oil-producing countries, the oil plunge led to the 
reduction of oil revenues of the national budget. This has negatively affected most 
economic activities in Kazakhstan. As a result of the economic crisis caused by the 
oil price plunge, in 2015 for the first time in many years, Kazakhstan has seen a 
reduction of public spending in tenge (national currency) terms - by 5%, and in US 
dollar terms - by 15%. This led to a sharp drop in income generation within the 
economy and, consequently, consumer demand. Other results of the oil price plunge 
include high inflation, decreased wages and a sharp reduction in consumption 
expenditures, especially on durable goods. 
During the last 5 years, foreign professionals working in Western Kazakhstan 
constituted the lion’s share of the total number of foreign employees in Kazakhstan. 
For example, the Atyrau region attracted 30% and the Mangghystau region 12.2% of 
all foreign labour forces officially working in the country Sadovskaya (2014). With 
another West Kazakhstan region, where the super-giant Karachaganak oil and gas 
field is situated, they received more than half of the work permits issued in 
Kazakhstan. The main reasons for this are the availability of well-paid jobs and the 
lack of qualified personnel. These jobs also encourage the resettlement of people 
from other regions of Kazakhstan. Another way of migration observed is a flow of 
shift employees working for oil and oil service companies. By way of illustration, we 
can say that the intensity of migration in the Mangghystau region was 15.7 per 1,000 
people whereas for the entire country this figure had a value of 0.7 per 1,000 people 
Yessimkhanova (2014). In general, the higher the gross regional product per capita is, 
the higher the balance of migration is. 
The maximum number of work permits obtained by foreign labour force was 
observed in 2007. The process was interrupted by the financial crisis of 2008 and has 
remained almost flat since 2012. It is worth pointing out that in July 2010 Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation established the Customs Union (CU).  According 
to CU rules, migrant workers from any CU member country are exempted from the need 
to obtain work permits. This circumstance substantially contributed to the decrease in 
the number of issued work permits. So, now it is much more difficult to compare the 
current statistics with the statistics for previous years as the methodology changed. 
The crisis affected the migration processes very seriously. Even though the 
number of official migrants possessing work permits remains almost the same, the 
number of in-country and illegal migrants decreased substantially. There is no official 
data for illegal migration, but according to Kazakh government estimates StatCom 
(2016), the number of illegal migrants decreased by three-fold since the end of 2014. 
These estimations are shared by oil industry sources. This happens because people 
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receiving work permits are usually skilled well-paid professionals always employed 
officially and often having long-term contracts. This is obviously not the case for 
illegal migrants. Nevertheless, the positive balance of inter-regional migration is 
observed in the cities of Astana and Almaty and also in the western regions of the 
country (Ministry of National Economy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2015).  
 
RELATIONS BETWEEN MIGRANTS AND THE LOCAL 
POPULATION 
 
Talking about the effect of the oil price plunge on migration processes in Kazakhstan 
we should not ignore one very important factor – in the oil producing regions of the 
country the relations between the local population and migrants are traditionally 
strained. One of the first social unrests in the former Soviet Union took place in 1989 
in the oil-producing Mangghystau region of Kazakhstan. In 2004–2006 numerous 
clashes between Kazakh and Turkish workers turned violent. These riots occurred 
within a secure industrial enclave of the super-giant Tengiz oil field in the Atyrau 
region. Kazakhs-repatriates (oralmans) from neighbouring Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan were one of the major driving forces of another case of social unrest, 
which took place in the city of Zhanaozen in December 2011. “Among the striking 
oil workers at Zhanaozen approximately a quarter were oralmans” (Zhampeissov, 
2013). These are just some examples that the situation is very serious and has 
produced numerous conflicts even during the periods of high oil prices.  
There were concerns that the economic crisis caused by low oil prices can 
aggravate the situation further. However, the good news is that the number of 
conflicts between the local population and the foreign labour force has already 
decreased and has a strong tendency for further decrease. The main reason for this 
is the outflow of the foreign labour force since the beginning of the oil price plunge. 
Oil producing western regions produce the highest birth rate in the country. In 
2015 the birth-rate in the Mangghystau region was 31.25 per 1000 inhabitants as 
opposed to 14.23 in the North-Kazakhstan region where the lowest birth-rate is 
observed with the country average of 22.66. The high birth rate is yet another factor 
complicating the situation on the labour market.  
 
POTENTIAL NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CURRENT OIL 
PRICE PLUNGE FOR MIGRATION AND GOVERNMENTAL 
MITIGATION MEASURES 
 
In the Table 1 we have tried to summarize the negative consequences of the oil plunge 
for migration processes and mitigation measures that could be taken by the Kazakh 
government.  
It is well known that we should not underestimate the uncertainty of the oil 
market, which has shown several times that most expectations regarding its 
behaviour appear to be wrong. However, we have to be ready to a scenario when oil 
prices will go further down and this scenario will continue over the next 5 years and 
beyond. This scenario implies the further worsening of the socio-economic situation 
in general and the situation with migration processes in particular. 
Regional and Business Studies Vol 10 No 1 
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Table 1 
 
Consequences of the Oil Price Plunge and  
Recommended Mitigation Measures 
 
No Existing or Possible Consequences 
Recommended Mitigation 
Measures 
1. Growth of unemployment resulting in 
deterioration of living standards and 
worsening of criminal situation 
Economic diversification, promotion 
of small and medium businesses, 
improvement of investment climate, 
implementation of state-funded 
infrastructure projects, vocational 
training programs, special assistance 
projects and public awareness 
campaigns. 
2. Growth of social tensions in oil-
producing regions of Kazakhstan 
3. Growth of tensions between the local 
population and ethnic repatriates 
(oralman) This was already noticed by 
Kourmanova  (2012) and Kuşçu (2014). 
4. Brain drain in the form of emigration 
of the most educated and skilled 
portion of the population. 
This consequence is probably the 
most difficult to deal with. The 
obvious responses to it are the 
creation of new well paid jobs through 
economic diversification and fighting 
corruption, but these actions are very 
difficult to implement. 
5. Crisis of single-industry cities3 relying 
on oil industry as a main source of 
income (Zhanaozen, Kulsary, Aksay). 
In addition to the measures 
mentioned in points 1, 2 and 3 above, 
the implementation of the State 
Development Program for Single-
Industry Cities 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The migration situation in Kazakhstan, which has one of the biggest share of migrant 
population in the world, has been seriously affected by the current oil price plunge. 
Low oil prices will continue taking dramatic toll on the Kazakh economy and this 
will inevitably affect the social sphere in general and migration situation in particular. 
Per the opinion of the World Bank Group (2015) “A difficult external environment will 
continue to affect Kazakhstan’s medium-term outlook”. Taking into consideration 
the dependence between changes in the real GDP and the balance of migration, 
                                                     
3 Single-industry cities of Kazakhstan are the cities where a substantial portion of the working 
population is employed by one or more city-forming enterprises. These enterprises are usually 
of the same industry and determine virtually all economic and social processes taking place in 
such a city. Currently, the developers of the State Development Program for Single-Industry 
Cities of Kazakhstan use the following classification: a city is considered a single-industry one 
if more than 20% of the production volume of this city is produced by one enterprise or more 
than 20% of the working population of this city is employed by this enterprise. 
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which was noted by many researchers and the Kazakh government agencies, urgent 
and well thought-over measures are required to tackle the negative economic 
consequences in the sphere of migration. This document is an attempt to describe 
and analyse the situation and to propose potential mitigation measures, which can 
improve the migration situation and more generally the situation in social sphere in 
the western oil-producing regions of Kazakhstan. 
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